The strand space model is one of the most successful and widely used formalisms for analysing security protocols. This might seem surprising given that the model is not able to reflect choice points in a protocol execution: the key concept in the strand space model is that of a bundle, which models exactly one possible execution of a security protocol. Inspired by the branching processes of Petri nets, we show that branching can be introduced into the strand space model in a very natural way: bundles can be generalized to branching bundles, which are able to capture several conflicting protocol executions. Our investigations of the theory of branching bundles will motivate the concept of symbolic branching bundles, and culminate in the result that every protocol has a strand space semantics in terms of a largest symbolic branching bundle. We hope our results provide a strong theoretical basis for comparing models and providing process calculi semantics in security protocol analysis. Altogether our work is related but different to a series of works by Crazzolara and Winskel. Throughout we will profit from a close relationship of the strand space model to event structures, which has already been pointed out by these authors.
Introduction
The strand space model [5] is one of the most successful and widely used formalisms for analysing security protocols. For example, it has been employed to verify security properties by hand, to give formal semantics to protocol logics, and as the underlying model of model-checking tools (c.f. [7] ). In spite of this success two points of criticism have been brought against it: one is that, in contrast to models based on multiset rewriting, it is an ad hoc model rather than rooted in a rich theory. The second is that it is not able to reflect aspects of branching such as choice points in a protocol execution. To explain the latter we recall that the central concept of the strand space model is that of the bundle. A bundle models exactly one snapshot of a protocol execution: a set of strands represents the sessions that have occurred so far while a relation between the send and receive events of the strands describes how messages have flowed between them.
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Both points of criticism have been countered by results of Crazzolara and Winksel [2, 1, 3] . On the one hand, they have shown that the strand space model is closely related to event-based models for concurrency such as event structures. On the other hand, aiming to obtain compositional event-based semantics for protocol languages, they have shown how the strand space model can be extended by a notion of conflict [3] . Their notion of conflict is introduced at the level of strand spaces, which are conceptually a level lower than bundles: a strand space fixes all the sessions that are to be considered in the protocol analysis; it is the space from which bundles are 'carved out'.
In this paper our thesis is that branching can be introduced into the strand space model very directly at the conceptual level of bundles. The idea is to generalize bundles to branching bundles in the same way as in Petri net theory branching processes generalize Petri net processes. Petri net branching processes [4] are introduced as a formalization of an initial part of a run of a Petri net, which can include conflicting choices. They come with a very satisfying theory: the branching processes of a Petri net form a complete lattice (modulo isomorphism) with respect to a natural notion of approximation. The largest element of this lattice captures all possible behaviour of the Petri net, and is called its unfolding.
In this paper we wish to investigate whether protocols have as satisfying a theory of branching bundles. If every protocol P had indeed a largest branching bundle, this branching bundle would capture all possible behaviour of P , and would thus provide a natural strand space semantics. This could provide a strong theoretical basis for comparing models and providing semantics for protocol languages. Our contributions are as follows:
(1) We show that bundles can indeed be generalized to branching bundles in a very natural way. Branching bundles are able to capture several conflicting protocol executions.
(2) We investigate the theory of branching bundles. We find that every branching bundle can be viewed as a labelled prime event structure. This will motivate a notion of computation state for branching bundles in terms of sub-bundles, and a transition relation between them. Following the approach of [4] we will investigate whether the branching bundles of a protocol form a complete lattice with respect to a natural notion of approximation. We will however obtain a negative result: the branching bundles of a protocol do not even form a complete partial order.
(3) By analysing this negative result we will, however, be led to a notion of symbolic branching bundle. We will obtain that the symbolic branching bundles of a protocol indeed form a complete lattice (modulo isomorphism). Thus, every protocol can be given a strand space semantics in terms of a largest symbolic branching bundle. We will motivate that this semantics is suitable for most situations in security protocol analysis.
In the following section we will introduce the strand space model using variations on the original definition of [2] and [6] . The remainder of the paper is structured according to the above contributions. All proofs can be found in the full version of the paper. Fröschle 
The Strand Space Model
Graph Terminology A labelled (directed) graph is a tuple (E, K, L, l) where E is the set of nodes, which in our context will depict events, K ⊆ E ×E is the set of edges, L is the set of labels, and l : E → L is a labelling function that assigns a label to every node. When L is clear from the context we will often keep it implicit for notational simplicity.
A labelled graph (E, K, L, l) is totally ordered if there is a total ordering e 1 e 2 . . . of the elements of E such that (e i , e j ) ∈ K if and only if j = i + 1. A labelled graph (E, K, L, l) is a labelled tree if K is acyclic and there is no backwards branching, i.e., if (e ′ , e) ∈ K and (e ′′ , e) ∈ K then e ′ = e ′′ . A branch of a tree is a possibly empty, finite or infinite sequence e 1 e 2 . . . of elements of E such that (e i , e i+1 ) ∈ K for all indices i. A labelled bi-graph is a tuple (E, ⇒, →, L, l) such that both (E, ⇒, L, l) and (E, →, L, l) are labelled graphs.
Message Algebra
In the following we assume that messages are modelled by a message algebra. The results we present here are independent of the actual structure of this algebra. We only assume a set of messages Mesg, a set of atomic messages AMesg, from which Mesg is built up from, and a binary relation ⊑ on Mesg that says when one message is contained in another. Messages and atomic messages may contain variables. A message is ground if it does not contain any variables. We denote the set of ground messages by GMesg.
Actions, Roles, and Protocols
In a protocol execution, principals can either send or receive messages. If a message is sent then it can contain data that have just been freshly generated such as nonces. This gives rise to the following set of actions:
In an action of the form '+ fresh N in M ', '+' indicates that message M is thought to be sent while N specifies which elements of M are thought to be freshly generated. We assume that only atomic messages can be freshly generated. In an action of the form '− M ', '−' indicates that message M is thought to be received. Given an action A ∈ Act of either of the two forms we use mesg(A) to depict M , sign(A) to depict '+', or '−' respectively. If sign(A) = + we will further use fresh(A) to depict N . A ground action is an action that does not contain any variables. We denote the set of ground actions by GAct. In the context of a labelled graph with label set GAct we will carry over the previous concepts for actions to the events of the graph in the obvious way. A trace is a finite sequence of ground actions.
A role defines the actions a principal can perform in a protocol session. Formally, a role is a finite sequence of actions R = A 1 . . . A n such that R1 for all i ∈ [1, n], for all N ∈ fresh(A i ) (a) N is a variable, and
Axiom (R1) makes sure that we cannot specify a constant to be freshly generated, and that variables that represent data to be freshly generated at some action cannot occur in previous actions. A protocol is a finite set of roles P = {R i } i∈r where r ∈ IN.
Intruder Model
The power of the Intruder is typically modelled by two ingredients: the set of messages initially known to the Intruder such as all public keys and his own private key; and a set of Intruder roles, which specify the Intruder's basic elements of attack such as decrypting a message with a key that he has already obtained. (Intruder roles are originally called parametric Intruder traces [5] .) Similarly to protocol roles, Intruder roles are essentially sequences of signed messages, where '+' denotes output and '−' denotes input. The results here are independent of the actual format of the Intruder roles. We only assume that an Intruder theory is given as a pair I = (K I , R I ) where K I ⊆ GMesg is the set of initial Intruder knowledge and R is the set of Intruder roles, and that each Intruder role is a finite sequence of actions of the following form:
We redefine the set of actions Act defined in the previous paragraph to include actions of this form: Act := Act ∪ IAct.
Strands, Strand Spaces, and Bundles
We now come to the core notions of the strand space model: strands and bundles. We define these concepts relative to a fixed protocol P .
A strand represents an instantiation of a protocol or Intruder role or of a prefix thereof. (We admit prefixes to be able to model incomplete protocol or Intruder sessions, a situation that naturally arises in a snaphot of a protocol execution.) Formally, a strand of P is a totally ordered labelled graph s = (E, ⇒, GAct, l) such that there is a prefix R of a role of P or R I and a ground substitution σ so that, assuming
• E = {e 1 , . . . , e n } with e 1 ⇒ . . . ⇒ e n , and
sign(e i ) = + and n ∈ fresh(e i ) then for all j < i, n ⊑ mesg(e j ), S3 ∀e ∈ E, if l(e) is of the form '+ m of I -Knowledge' then m ∈ K I .
Observe how the axioms ensure that s can indeed be understood as an instantiation of R via σ. We call E the set of events of s, denoted by events(s). If an event e has sign '+', we call it a send event, and if it has sign '−', a receive event respectively.
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We say message m originates on event e i if e i is a send event, m ⊑ mesg(e i ), and for all j < i, m ⊑ mesg(e j ). Note that Axiom (S2) ensures that when an atomic message is freshly generated at an event then it originates on that event. We call l(e 1 ) . . . l(e n ) the trace of strand s. We say two strands are disjoint if their sets of events are disjoint.
A snapshot of a protocol execution consists of the set of (complete and incomplete) protocol and Intruder sessions that have been executed so far plus information on how the messages flow between the sessions. This leads us to the concept of strand space. 2 A strand space of P is a pair B = (S, →) where S is a set of pairwise disjoint strands of P , and → ⊆ E×E is a relation on the events of S, E = s∈S events(s). The single-arrow relation is thought to represent the flow of messages. It is clear that we can equivalently regard B as a labelled bi-graph (E, ⇒, →, GAct, l), a view we will often adopt. We call E the set of events of B, denoted by events(B).
A strand space can contain situations that are counter-intuitive such as a receive event leading to a send event. A snapshot of a protocol execution is modelled by a bundle. Formally, a bundle of P is a strand space B = (E, ⇒, →, GAct, l) of P such that the following axioms are satisfied:
B1 if e 1 → e 2 then sign(e 1 ) = +, sign(e 2 ) = −, and mesg(e 1 ) = mesg(e 2 ), B2 if e 1 → e 2 then there is no other e ′ 1 such that e ′ 1 → e 2 , B3 ∀e ∈ E, if sign(e) = − then there is e ′ ∈ E such that e ′ → e,
B6 ∀e ∈ E, if sign(e) = + and n ∈ fresh(e) we have: n is uniquely originating on e: there is no event e ′ with e ′ = e such that n originates on e ′ .
Axiom (B1) ensures that messages flow from send events to receive events. Axiom (B2) enforces that an event can receive its message from at most one event. Axiom (B3) guarantees that each receive event is matched up with a send event. Axiom (B4) ensures that the reflexive and transitive closure of → ∪ ⇒ is a partial order, which, as we will explain below, captures causality. Axiom (B5) ensures that every event depends on only finitely many previous events. It is necessary in our setting since we allow bundles to contain infinitely many events. Axiom (B6) ensures that if an atomic message is specified to be freshly generated on some event then on any other strand it has to be received before it can be sent.
We denote the relation → ∪ ⇒ by ≺ 1 . ≺ 1 expresses immediate causality: If e → e ′ then e is an immediate cause of e ′ due to the message flow causality between received messages and sent messages. If e ⇒ e ′ then e is an immediate cause of e ′ due to the execution order causality within a protocol session. The reflexive and transitive closure of ≺ 1 , denoted by , is a partial order, which captures causality.
For every event e of a bundle there is at most one event e ′ such that e ′ ⇒ e, and at most one event e ′′ such that e ′′ → e. If the first exists define ⇒-pred (e) = e ′ otherwise define ⇒-pred (e) = nil . If the latter exists define →-pred (e) = e ′′ , and →-pred (e) = nil otherwise. Naturally we assume nil ∈ E.
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Branching Bundles
We now define our concept of branching bundles. As motivated in the introduction branching bundles should be capable of representing several conflicting protocol executions. To obtain them as a natural generalization of bundles, we will define them as bi-graphs of events labelled by actions of GAct. In contrast to bundles we will allow them to contain events that represent conflicting points in a protocol execution. We can distinguish between three situations when two events e 1 and e 2 of a protocol execution should naturally be considered to be in conflict with each other:
(i) e 1 and e 2 belong to different futures of the same session;
(ii) one of e 1 and e 2 , say e 1 , is a send event that sends as part of its message a freshly generated atomic message n, while the other event, e 2 , contradicts unique origination of n: e 2 sends n as part of its message but n has never been received earlier in the session of e 2 .
(iii) e 1 and e 2 are causally dependent on two events that are in conflict according to (i) or (ii).
The first situation motivates that a concept of branching bundles must be based on a concept of branching strands. So let us analyse in turn what sources of branching there are within a session. When does a session split into different futures?
(i) The receive actions of a protocol specification typically contain variables to be bound to parts of the incoming message. A session with such a receive action will have different futures depending on the received message. (The different futures will, however, be equivalent modulo the value that is bound to the respective input variable.) This situation is depicted in Figure 1 (a).
(ii) The protocol specification may contain choice points. For example, the course of the SSL/TLS handshake protocol depends on which method for establishing the pre-master-secret is negotiated at the start, and on whether client authen-Fröschle tication is requested by the Server or not. Typically the choice between several options of a protocol will be resolved by received input. On the other hand, to abstract away from detail, we may allow protocols to contain nondeterministic choice. The first situation is depicted in Figure 1 (b).
There is yet another source of branching if we take a purely observational view. Say Eavesdropper Eve observes the first two actions of a session, but she cannot tell to which role these actions belong to: according to their format the actions could form an initial part of an instance of role A or of role B. Then in one future of Eve the observed session may evolve into an instance of role A, whereas in another future of Eve it will evolve into an instance of role B.
(iii) An observed session may have different futures due to ambiguity in the protocol specification.
To include (iii) as a source of branching is a design decision and may seem counter-intuitive at first. To include it seems, however, in the spirit of the strand space model: it is consistent with the fact that if there is ambiguity in the protocol specification then a strand may be interpreted as an instance of several roles. To resolve this type of ambiguity one would need to keep a role identifier at each strand, which would make the model less abstract and technically cumbersome. As we will now see our decision to include (iii) leads to a very simple formalization of branching strand. In the following, let P be a protocol.
Definition 3.1 A branching strand of P , abbreviated b-strand of P , is a labelled tree s = (E, ⇒, GAct, l) such that all branches of s are strands of P . (Note that this implies that branching strands are trees of finite depth.)
By definition every strand is a b-strand, and every b-strand whose events are totally ordered is a strand. We carry over all the concepts defined for strands in Section 2 in the obvious way. The notation ⇒-pred (e) naturally also carries over.
Having defined a notion of b-strands we obtain b-strand spaces in the obvious way. A b-strand space of P is a pair B = (S, →) where S is a set of disjoint bstrands of P , and → ⊆ E × E is a relation on the events of S, E = s∈S events(s). Analogously to strand spaces, we will often view B as a labelled bi-graph (E, ⇒, →, GAct, l). The three situations of conflict pinpointed in the beginning of the section give rise to a binary conflict relation on the events of a b-strand space. Definition 3.2 Let B = (E, ⇒, →, GAct, l) be a b-strand space of P . Two distinct events e 1 , e 2 ∈ E are in immediate conflict, written e 1 # 1 e 2 , if
(ii) sign(e 1 ) = +, and there is n ∈ fresh(e 1 ) such that n originates on e 2 , or (iii) the symmetric condition holds.
Two events e 1 , e 2 ∈ E are in conflict, written e 1 # B e 2 , if there exist distinct events e ′ 1 , e ′ 2 ∈ E such that e ′ 1 # 1 e ′ 2 and e ′ i (⇒ ∪ →) * e i for i = 1, 2. For e ∈ E, we say e is in self-conflict if e# B e.
To be able to interpret a b-strand space as a branching protocol execution we need to impose axioms. Naturally we will adopt Axioms (B1) to (B5) of the def-Fröschle inition of bundles. However, Axiom (B6) will be dropped: the axiom on unique origination is clearly not needed when events are allowed to be in conflict. On the other hand, in the presence of conflict a new axiom will be required: we need to make sure that events are never in conflict with any of the events they are causally dependent on. Formally, this gives rise to the following definition. Definition 3.3 A branching bundle of P , abbreviated b-bundle of P , is a b-strand space B of P such that Axioms (B1) to (B5) as well as the following axiom hold:
BB No event of B is in self-conflict.
Analogously to bundles, due to Axiom (B4), we can associate a causality relation B with each b-bundle B; we carry over all concepts related to B from bundles to b-bundles. Due to Axiom (BB), for every b-bundle B, # B is irreflexive as well as symmetric; this is what one would expect of a binary conflict relation.
Finally, we show that bundles are exactly those b-bundles where no events are in conflict. This illustrates that b-bundles are indeed the generalization of bundles we have been looking for. 
Towards a Theory of Branching Bundles
We now investigate whether b-bundles have as satisfying a theory as Petri net branching processes. In Section 4.2 we examine the relationship of b-bundles to event structures. In Section 4.3 we explore whether the b-bundles of a protocol approximate (modulo isomorphism) a largest b-bundle. In preparation, we introduce a notion of sub-b-bundle in Section 4.1, which is analogous to that of Petri net sub-b-processes [4] .
In the following, we work as usual relative to a fixed protocol P . Given a bbundle B of P we will implicitly assume B = (E, ⇒, →, GAct, l). We carry this convention over to b-bundles B 1 , B 2 , and B ′ in the obvious way; e.g., we assume
B-bundles come with a notion of isomorphism induced by the standard notion for labelled bi-graphs. As usual the relation 'isomorphic' is an equivalence relation. Next to isomorphism a notion of homomorphism for b-bundles will be central. A homomorphism h from b-bundle B 1 to b-bundle B 2 formalizes the fact that B 1 can be folded onto a part of B 2 . Given an event e of a b-bundle B, we define ⇓ e = {e ′ ∈ E | e ′ (⇒) * e}. Definition 4.1 Let B 1 and B 2 be two b-bundles of P . A homomorphism from B 1 to B 2 is a mapping h from E 1 to E 2 such that (i) for every e ∈ E 1 , l 1 (e) = l 2 (h(e)),
(ii) for every e ∈ E 1 , the restriction of h to ⇓ 1 e is a bijection between ⇓ 1 e and ⇓ 2 h(e), and (iii) for every e, e ′ ∈ E 1 , if e → 1 e ′ then h(e) → 2 h(e ′ ).
Fröschle
It is easy to show that the composition of two homomorphisms is a homomorphism. If a homomorphism is bijective then the converse of (iii) is also true (using the fact that B 1 and B 2 are b-bundles). Thus, an isomorphism is a bijective homomorphism.
Sub-b-bundles
We introduce a natural notion of sub-b-bundle, which formalizes when a b-bundle is an initial part of another b-bundle. Definition 4.2 Let B and B ′ be two b-bundles of P . B ′ is a sub-b-bundle of B if E ′ ⊆ E and the identity on E ′ is a homomorphism from B ′ to B. If B ′ is a bundle we also say that B ′ is a sub-bundle of B.
In other words, B ′ is a sub-b-bundle of B if, E ′ ⊆ E, and for every e ∈ E ′ , (1) l ′ (e) = l(e), (2) ⇒ ′ -pred (e) = ⇒ -pred (e), and (3) → ′ -pred (e) = → -pred (e) (using the fact that B and B ′ are b-bundles). This shows that B ′ really is an initial part of B.
We provide a characterization of the sub-b-bundles and sub-bundles of a bbundle B in terms of downwards-closed subsets of E. This will further illustrate the concept of sub-b-bundle but will also be needed in the next section. A subset E ′ of E is downwards-closed if, for all e 1 , e 2 ∈ E, if e 1 B e 2 and e 2 ∈ E ′ then e 1 ∈ E ′ . If B ′ is a sub-b-bundle of B then E ′ is clearly downwards-closed. This follows from the observation of the previous paragraph. On the other hand, every downwards-closed set of events determines a sub-b-bundle in a natural way. (ii) A bundle B ′ is a sub-bundle of B if and only if B ′ = sbb(E ′ ) for some downwards-closed and conflict-free subset E ′ of E.
Branching Bundles and Event Structures
A (labelled prime) event structure is a tuple (E, ≤, #, L, l) consisting of a set E of events, which are partially ordered by ≤, the causal dependency relation, a binary, symmetric and irreflexive relation # ⊆ E × E, the conflict relation, a set L of labels, and a labelling function l : E → L, which assigns a label to each event. Further, the following conditions must be satisfied for all e, e ′ , e ′′ ∈ E: Axiom (E1) means we only consider discrete processes where an event occurrence depends on finitely many previous events. Axiom (E2) makes sure that each event inherits conflict from the events it is causally dependent on.
Event structures come equipped with a notion of computation state, called configuration, and a transition relation between configurations. A configuration of an event structure (E, ≤, #, L, l) is a set X ⊆ E, which is (i) downwards-closed: ∀e, e ′ ∈ E : e ′ ≤ e & e ∈ X ⇒ e ′ ∈ X, and (ii) conflict-free: ∀e, e ′ ∈ X : ¬(e#e ′ ).
For two configurations X, X ′ and an event e we write X l(e) −→ X ′ when e / ∈ X and X ′ = X ∪ {e}. In this way every event structure gives rise to a labelled transition system.
We shall now see that b-bundles are closely related to event structures. The following is straightforward:
(i) Every b-bundle B of P can be viewed as an event structure. This event structure gives a more abstract representation of B in that it abstracts away from the distribution of events over b-strands.
Just as the configurations of an event structure define its computation states, the sub-bundles of a b-bundle can be considered to define the reachable states of that part of the protocol execution described by the b-bundle. From Section 4.1 we know that the sub-bundles of a b-bundle can be captured in terms of conflict-free and downwards-closed subsets of events. Hence, we obtain:
(ii) There is a one-to-one correspondence between the sub-bundles of B and the configurations of bb2ev (B), given by: Proposition 4.6 Let B be a b-bundle of P .
(i) If B ′ is a sub-bundle of B then E ′ (the set of events of B ′ ) is a configuration of bb2ev (B).
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We can define a transition relation between the sub-bundles of a b-bundle analogously to how this is done for event structures: given a b-bundle B, for two subbundles B ′ , B ′′ of B, and an event e ∈ E, we write B ′ l(e) −→ B ′′ when e ∈ E ′ and E ′′ = E ′ ∪ {e}. Altogether, we have:
(iii) Every b-bundle B induces a labelled transition system, where the states are given by the sub-bundles of B and the transition relation describes how a subbundle can evolve into a new one by executing an action. The induced labelled transition system is isomorphic to that induced by bb2ev (B). 
Approximation
Every b-bundle of a protocol P captures an initial part of the behaviour of P . We now wish to investigate whether the b-bundles of P consistently approximate, modulo isomorphism, a largest b-bundle. If every protocol P had indeed a largest b-bundle, this b-bundle would capture all possible behaviour of P , and would thus provide a natural strand space semantics for protocols. Furthermore, in view of the results of the previous section this strand space semantics would come with a notion of computation state in terms of bundles, and a transition relation between them. The induced labelled transition system would give the corresponding interleaving semantics of the protocol, while the protocol would also have an abstract partial order semantics in terms of the induced labelled event structure. First, we need to define a natural notion of approximation for b-bundles. Intuitively, one b-bundle approximates another when it is, up to isomorphism, an initial part of the other. This can be formalized as follows. Naturally, approximation is preserved by isomorphism. Thus, ≤ can be extended to isomorphism classes of b-bundles. Let IBB (P ) denote the set of isomorphism classes of b-bundles of P . As one would expect ≤ is a partial order on IBB (P ). To establish that the b-bundles of P consistently approximate a largest b-bundle we would further like to obtain that (IBB (P ), ≤) is a complete lattice. However, we will now demonstrate that this does not hold. Indeed we have: Proposition 4.10 (IBB (P ), ≤) is neither a lattice nor a complete partial order.
Proof. To prove this result we will exhibit two b-bundles that have upper bounds but no least upper bound. The b-bundles (which are also bundles) are presented in Figure 2 .
Bundle A contains one instance of trace +m 1 +m 2 and one instance of trace −m 1 −m 2 , with the send and receive events matched up in the obvious way. Bundle B contains two instances of trace +m 1 +m 2 and one instance of trace −m 1 −m 2 , with the receive events of the latter matched up to send events of different strands. Observe that A and B are incomparable: B can clearly not be injectively folded onto A; while there cannot be a homomorphism from A to B because there is no strand in B with two outgoing message-flow arrows.
By a similar argument it is clear that any upper bound of A and B must contain at least two instances of trace +m 1 +m 2 and two instances of trace −m 1 −m 2 . If two b-bundles contain the same number of events and are comparable with respect to ≤ then there will be a bijective homomorphism between them, and hence an • +m2
• −m1
• −m2
• +m1
• +m2
A B
• −m2 U V Fig. 2 . m 1 and m 2 are ground messages, +m 1 stands short for + fresh ∅ in m 1 , and similarly for +m 2 . It is clear that there is a protocol P such that A to V are b-bundles of P .
isomorphism. Thus, any upper bound of A and B which contains only eight events is, up to isomorphism, a minimal upper bound of A and B.
Consider b-bundles U and V of Figure 2 . It is easy to check that both of them are upper bounds of A and B. Further, both of them have only eight events, and thus, up to isomorphism, they must be minimal upper bounds. On the other hand, U and V are not isomorphic: e.g., U has an event labelled by +m 1 with two outgoing message-flow arcs while V does not.
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Since (IBB (P ), ≤) is not even a complete partial order, ≤ cannot be interpreted as a notion of approximation in the information-ordering sense: a b-bundle that is higher in the order does not extend the information of the elements below in a consistent way. It also indicates that a largest b-bundle might simply not exist. Thus, the theory of branching bundles does not turn out to be very satisfying. Analysing the above counter-example will, however, lead us to a satisfying theory of symbolic b-bundles.
Remark 4.11
Those readers who are familiar with the strand space model may wonder whether a counter-example could still be obtained if the →-relation in bundles was disallowed to be forwards-branching (and the Intruder must duplicate messages explicitly). Note that for b-bundles forwards-branching would still be natural,
and a more involved counter-example could be constructed.
Symbolic Branching Bundles
Let us take another look at the bundles of Figure 2 . One could argue that A and B represent the same information with respect to the Intruder's viewpoint. On the one hand, at both, A and B, the information the Intruder has gained so far is essentially the same: the input to a strand with trace −m 1 −m 2 can be obtained from the send events of a strand with trace +m 1 +m 2 , where instances of the latter trace do not require any input.
On the other hand, the information the Intruder may gain in the future is also essentially the same at both, A and B:
for example, to simulate a future of B by a future of A, if the Intruder employs one of the two +m 1 -events of B as send input to a future strand, he can use the one +m 1 -event of A in exactly the same way. Furthermore, if in a future of B each of the two +m 1 +m 2 strands is extended by an action such that the actions are different but non-conflicting, then in A a new strand with trace +m 1 +m 2 can be spawned, so as to obtain two non-conflicting strands with analogous traces. This is why, on second look, it is not surprising that b-bundles do not form an information ordering: there are many inconsistent ways of representing the same information. On the positive side, this also suggests that we may still obtain an information ordering if we work with a notion of symbolic b-bundle.
How could a notion of symbolic b-bundle look like? We would expect that in a symbolic b-bundle all branches that represent essentially the same information are 'glued together', thereby folding a space of b-strands together into a space of symbolic b-strands. A space of symbolic b-strands is a b-strand space whose bstrands are considered symbolically. This means we need to relax our notion of conflict. Since a b-strand may now represent several, possibly parallel, sessions, two events that have the same ⇒-predecessor are not necessarily in conflict any more:
, and (c) →-pred (e 1 ) ∼ →-pred (e 2 ).
It is easy to check that ∼ is indeed an equivalence relation. Denote the equivalence class of event e by [e] ∼ . Given a b-bundle B, the folding of B, denoted by fold (B), is defined to be the tuple (E f , ⇒ f , → f , GAct, l f ) where
• ∀f 1 , f 2 ∈ E f , f 1 ⇒ f f 2 if and only if e 1 ⇒ B e 2 for some e 1 ∈ f 1 , e 2 ∈ f 2 ,
• ∀f 1 , f 2 ∈ E f , f 1 → f f 2 if and only if e 1 → B e 2 for some e 1 ∈ f 1 , e 2 ∈ f 2 ,
• ∀f ∈ E f , l(f ) = a if and only if l(e) = a for some (or equivalently all) e ∈ f . (ii) If B is a bundle then fold (B) is a symbolic bundle.
(iii) fold is a surjective homomorphism from B to fold (B).
On the other hand, every symbolic b-bundle can be transformed into a b-bundle by disentangling non-conflicting strands that are glued together. In particular, every symbolic bundle can be transformed into a bundle. (These connections will be formalized in the full version of the paper.)
The transformations give rise to the following observation, which shows how reachability problems on bundles can be reduced to reachability problems on symbolic bundles.
Proposition 5.5 Assume a protocol P and a finite set of strands S of P . There is a bundle B of P with S ⊆ strands(B) if and only if the events of S are conflictfree and there is a symbolic bundle B ′ of P with traces(S) ⊆ traces(B ′ ). (We use strands(B), traces(S), and traces(B ′ ) with the obvious meaning.)
This shows that it should be adequate to work with symbolic bundles in most situations. Most verification problems for security protocols can be expressed as reachability problems: check whether a situation that represents an attack can be reached. In the strand space model this can be formalized as follows:
Given: A protocol P , and a finite set of strands S.
Decide: Is there a finite bundle B such that S ⊆ strands(B)?
A Theory of Symbolic Branching Bundles
It is straightforward to carry over all concepts and positive results of Section 4 to symbolic b-bundles. In particular, we have a partial order ≤ on ISBB (P ), the set of isomorphism classes of symbolic b-bundles of P . However, now we indeed obtain: Theorem 6.1 (ISBB (P ), ≤) is a complete lattice.
Due to Axiom (SBB) the theorem can be proved analogously to Engelfriet's Fröschle result on Petri net branching processes [4] . The proof will be provided in the full version of the paper. Theorem 6.1 guarantees the existence of a unique maximal element in ISBB (P ), which captures all possible behaviour of P in a symbolic fashion. We call it the symbolic unfolding of P . Thus, every protocol has a strand space semantics in terms of its symbolic unfolding. Further, by the results of Section 4.2 this semantics comes with a notion of computation state in terms of symbolic sub-bundles, a transition relation, and close relations to event structures.
It remains to be investigated whether restricting our attention to the symbolic unfolding is indeed suitable in most situations of security protocol analysis. We will also examine whether it can help with the state space explosion problem in model-checking tools. On the theoretical side, the relationship between symbolic b-bundles and b-bundles can be further formalized using category theory.
